Future Oil Crunch Still in the Cards?

When I started this blog (Q4 2017), my assumption was that we would hit an oil crisis sometime between 2020 - 2022. And by oil crisis, I meant that oil prices could hit $150 (give or take). That forecast won't come true due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Maybe it wasn't going to happen even without the pandemic. However, with the vaccine rolling out, might the pandemic potentially result in a higher probability of an oil crisis hitting? Perhaps I just need to shift my forecast out to 2023 - 2025?

IEA (May 2020) has the following investment spending data on oil and gas. 

2010: $425 billion 
2011: $460 
2012: $533 
2013: $540 
2014: $577 
2015: $507 
2016: $458 
2017: $470 
2018: $478 
2019: $483 
2020: $347

This is what they have to say about what that 2020 investment number means for global supply:

The downturn means that significant oil and gas resources that would otherwise have been available to the market in the coming years will not be there. Some of this is deferred, i.e. production that will take longer to come to market. Some of it will not come through at all, either because new projects are simply shelved or because some existing production is shut in due to the crisis and not restarted.

What does this mean for future supply-demand balances and for energy transitions? Already, the decline in investment in 2020 takes an estimated 2.1 mb/d away from anticipated oil supply in 2025, and some 60 billion cubic metres (bcm) off natural gas output. However, if investment were to stay at at 2020 levels for the next five years then this would reduce the previously-expected level of oil supply in 2025 by almost 9 mb/d, and bring down natural gas output in that year by some 240 bcm.

Wood Mackenzie (Dec 11) appears to indicate that we'll see similar levels of investment in 2021:

Budgets in upstream oil and gas were slashed again in 2020, and we expect spend in 2021 of just US$300 billion, 30% down on 2019, 60% on the 2014 peak . . . A recovery in oil demand back to over 100 million b/d by late 2022 increases risk of a material supply gap later this decade, triggering an upward spike in price. A recovery in oil demand back to over 100 million b/d by late 2022 increases risk of a material supply gap later this decade, triggering an upward spike in price. 

My understanding is that the last greenfield projects from the 2014 investment highs went online in 2020 so that is 6 years from investment to oil production. Now obviously shale investments can come online much quicker than 6 years. I guess my point is: what percentage of IEA's 9 mb/d reduction in supply result if we have say just 2 more years of low investments versus the full 6 years? I would think it is in the 70% range.

Wood Mackenzie is already forecasting that 2021 investments will be lower than 2020 by 13.5%. That means we already have 1 of those 5 years of low investments in the bag. Also, looking at investments from 2016 - 2019, it doesn't look like investments in oil just ramp up rapidly. I would make a bet that 2022 doesn't reach the 2020 level either.