Thursday, April 26, 2018

Part 2. Libya: What happens post-Khalifa Haftar?

In Part 1, I discussed what is happening in Libya. The short answer is that the commander of the LNA in the east, Khalifa Haftar, is suffering from health problems, which came to light on Tuesday, April 10th.

This blog post looks at what may happen post-Haftar.

Al Jazeera on April 16th did some interesting analysis of the situation should Haftar lose power.

Outcome 1: Another tribe in the east called Awaqir might try to gain control of the GNA. It happens to be the largest tribe in the area.

Outcome 2:  The GNA might try to consolidate its power across both the east and the west.

Outcome 3: Haftar has the support of Egypt. They would want to replace him with someone favorable to them.

Reuters on April 18th reported:

A car bomb hit the convoy of the chief of staff of the eastern Libyan military outside Benghazi on Wednesday, killing one person and wounding at least two other people, though he himself survived, security and military officials said.

I'd highlight that within one week of Haftar's hospitalization, there were already attempts to gain power in the region.

The New York Times reported on the situation on April 19th and provided some interesting tidbits about the politics in the region.

Although General Hifter styles himself as a military virtuoso who forged Libya’s only disciplined army, in practice his Libyan National Army is a loose coalition of militias headed by strong-willed commanders. Now, every day that he is absent from Benghazi, speculation grows that his coalition could crack as rival commanders turn on each other.

For several years France openly sided with General Hifter, to the detriment of the United Nations-backed unity government in Tripoli, in an effort to project French power while forming alliances with local forces fighting Islamist extremism. More recently, Paris has taken a more evenhanded approach.

Like Al Jazeera, The New York Times discusses the fact that Haftar (they spell his name Hifter) was able to keep a number of militias together as the LNA. If he should fall out of power, will these militias really stick together?

It is also interesting to read about France's position in Libya. They also were part of the coalition that sent missiles into Syria. And France took the lead in dealing with the situation that arose last year with the Lebanon Prime Minister.

CNBC also discussed the situation on April 18th.

For rival forces waiting for the news on Haftar, this may be their window, and the country could witness a rush to target oil infrastructure and disrupt operations in the event of his death. Eurasia Group estimates this would lead to a decline in average production in Libya from 1.1 million bpd in 2018 to roughly 900,000 "in the most benign scenarios."

Being a business cable station, CNBC focuses the situation on oil. A decline of 200,000 bpd is rather significant considering that production cuts by OPEC/Russia are at 163% of goals and world stockpiles might decline by 1.3 million barrels per day under the current situation. Libya production declines would just cause that decline to gain strength.

My opinion (assuming that Haftar is at a minimum going to have far less power than he had before April 10th, Tuesday) is the 200,000 bpd is the likely outcome in the short-term. Yes, I could see infighting, but oil brings in money and so it creates strange bed fellows. It is likely that the various factions in the East will agree to keep the operations going though disagreements will erupt, which will result in the production decline. These disagreements will revolve around how much money each faction gets. They'll likely want more than they currently get, which if the disarray last long enough will slowly make the declines in production worse as not enough money will be spent on capital expenditures.


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